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Introduction  
Is a high level of public debt inherently more 
dangerous within a monetary union? During the 
1990s it was often argued that only by entering 
the EMU could Italy (or Spain) protect itself from 
the high interest rates it had to pay on its large 
public debt. The argument was that by joining 
the single currency, Italy could convince 
financial markets that it would not inflate away 
the value of its debt and hence benefit from 
lower risk premia.  
Oddly enough, the opposite augment is often 
used today to explain Italy’s current high risk 
premium: Italy (and Spain) has to pay a high risk 
premium because it has lost the option to use the 
printing press, so the argument goes today. 
Moreover, it has been argued that the higher 
interest burden could go beyond the willingness 
of the population to pay taxes, thus pushing the 
country into default if interest rates stay too 
high.  
This note first argues that a priori default and 
inflation should be two equivalent ways to 
reduce the burden of a high public debt and, 
similarly, two equivalent types of risk to which 
an investor who lends funds to a government is 
exposed (this is not of course a novel 
observation). This would suggest that, in 
principle, belonging to a monetary union does 
not lead systematically to higher risk premia.  
The historical record shows that during the early 
1990s Italy faced a much higher burden in terms 
of high interest rates and interest expenditure 
than today. Nevertheless the current position of 
Italy is perceived as even more dangerous than 
then. 
The key question that remains at the analytical 
level is thus whether there are other mechanisms 
that make a formal default with a haircut 
different from debt monetization, which reduces 
the purchasing power for investors by the same 
amount. This paper argues that there is indeed a 
difference because a formal sovereign default 
invariably leads to a banking crisis. Moreover, 
within a monetary union a sovereign is more 
exposed to liquidity problems than a country 
with an independent currency and any of its 
problems quickly spill over into the banking 
system, which cannot survive without a reliable 
source of liquidity given that banks are by nature 
highly leveraged institutions.    
In terms of policy prescriptions one conclusion is 
that less effort and financing should be devoted 
to trying to lower yields on peripheral 
government debt, but a lender of last resort is 
needed for both sovereigns and the banks. 
Another policy priority should be to stabilise the 
banking system in such a way that it can survive 
even if government debt yields increase. 2 | DANIEL GROS 
 
The analytical issue 
Instability of high public debt within and 
outside a monetary union 
It is commonplace by now that a high level of 
public debt can lead to positive, vicious, feed-
back loops and even multiple equilibria in a 
monetary union. The argument is quite simple: 
even a rather high level of public debt would be 
sustainable if the government had to pay only a 
low interest rate, say, close to the compensation 
required on a riskless investment. However, the 
same level of debt might become unsustainable, 
forcing a country into default, if the borrowing 
cost is much higher. Hence many authors (most 
persuasively de Grauwe, 2011) have argued that 
there might be multiple equilibria: if the market 
thinks the government can pay, it will be able to 
pay because its borrowing cost will be low. 
However, if the market thinks the government 
cannot pay, in practice it will not be able to pay 
because the high risk premium requested will 
make the debt service so expensive that it will 
not be able to find the necessary resources. 
Doubts about the ability of a government to 
service its debt could thus become self-fulfilling. 
This line of reasoning has been used to justify 
central banks’ interventions in the market, for 
example, the bond purchase programme of the 
ECB, the Securities Market Programme (SMP). 
Many economists seem to forget that during the 
1990s a similar argument was used to justify the 
creation of EMU with an independent central 
bank. The reasoning was quite simple: 
A fixed exchange rate regime can experience a 
self-fulfilling crisis if a high risk premium 
leads to high domestic interest rates that 
depress domestic activity, and thus make it 
more likely that the government will actually 
abandon the system. Depending on the 
parameter configuration, two equilibria might 
exist. One is characterized by low interest rates 
and a low (possibly zero) probability that the 
exchange rate commitment will be abandoned; 
the other is characterized by high interest rates 
and a high probability that the exchange rate 
commitment will be abandoned. (Adrian & 
Gros (1999)1 
                                                            
1 Note that this quote refers to the analysis of a 
country under a fixed exchange regime; however it 
applies also to the case of free-floating exchange rates. 
Countries with a high level of debt thus seem to 
be presented with only bad choices: if they enter 
a monetary union, a speculative attack can force 
them to default. But if they keep their monetary 
autonomy, a speculative attack can force them 
into high inflation. Calvo (1988) confirms this: he 
considers both the case of a country with 
monetary autonomy and the case of a country 
without monetary autonomy. He finds that 
multiple equilibria can arise in both cases. He 
also finds that in both cases the high interest rate 
equilibrium is Pareto inferior. 
This type of result is not surprising. From the 
point of view of investors, it should not really 
matter whether the government defaults on its 
obligations and imposes a haircut on investors or 
whether it is forced into high inflation, which 
then reduces the real value of the debt securities 
they hold, even without a formal default. An 
example easily proves this point. Assume for 
instance that within a monetary union the 
probability of a default of a member country is 
1/5 and that the haircut in case of default is 20%. 
This would justify an interest rate premium 
(over the riskless rate) of 4 percentage points. If 
the country had kept its own currency, the risk 
of abandoning the hard currency policy might 
also be 1/5 and the inflation rate, in case the 
hard currency option is abandoned, might be 
also 20%. This would also require for a risk-
neutral investor an additional compensation 
(risk premium) of 4 percentage points. The risk 
(and thus its price) should be the same under 
both circumstances: i.e. being part of a monetary 
area or having one’s own currency.   
One could of course argue that, at least for a euro 
area member country, both the cost of defaulting 
on government debt and that of exiting the euro 
area would be much higher than the cost of 
merely exiting a fixed exchange rate regime (and 
permitting inflation to increase to double digit 
figures). However, the usual models of 
speculative attacks would then also imply that, 
given the much higher cost of defaulting, the 
credibility of the government not to default 
                                                                                                   
The debt burden in both cases would be reduced 
through inflation; the difference is that under the 
fixed regime there is first a currency crisis and the exit 
from the hard peg regime. A number of other authors 
arrive at similar conclusions; see, for example, 
Obstfeld (1986 and 1995).  SPECULATIVE ATTACKS WITHIN OR OUTSIDE A MONETARY UNION | 3 
 
should be much higher and consequently the 
likelihood of multiple equilibria much lower. 
This was indeed one argument widely used to 
show the advantages of a country giving up its 
currency. 
A key aspect of the models of multiple equilibria 
is that with the bad equilibrium (with high 
interest rates) investors expect either inflation or 
a default, but the government is not necessarily 
forced to validate these expectations. This is 
indeed what happened during the turbulent 
period that preceded EMU. 
The case of Italy 
The case of Italy is instructive in this respect. 
Italy’s debt-to-GDP ratio is today about 120%, 
very close to the value of the early 1990s. At that 
time Italy was also in financial difficulties, with a 
much higher deficit and interest rates than 
today. 
The key parameter for the government debt 
sustainability is the difference between the 
borrowing cost and the growth rate of GDP, 
which is often also called the ‘snowball factor’: If 
the interest rate is higher than the growth rate, 
the debt-to-GDP ratio will continue to grow and 
eventually explode unless the country 
continuously runs a primary surplus. In the case 
of Italy, since nominal GDP growth rates have 
not varied that much over time (2008-09 
provides the only exception), the evolution of the 
snowball factor depends crucially on the ‘risk 
premium’, i.e. the difference between the risk-
free rate and Italy’s effective borrowing cost. 
Figure 1 shows the difference between the long-
term interest rate on Italian government debt 
and the growth rate of nominal GDP (realised 
over the preceding twelve months). It is apparent, 
that the country was under extreme stress 
during the wave of speculative ‘attacks’ of the 
early 1990s. In 1993, when the authorities were 
still defending the peg within the European 
Monetary System (EMS), the difference between 
the (nominal) interest rate and the growth rate of 
(nominal) GDP was over 10 percentage points. 
This did decline somewhat after the country left 
the EMS, but the snowball factor fluctuated 
around 8-9% during the following few years 
during which the exchange rate fluctuated 
widely and tensions in financial markets 
remained high. 
At the time, the average maturity of public debt 
was rather low so that the higher nominal 
interest rates quickly resulted in higher 
government expenditure on interest, which 
remained above 11% of GDP over the period 
1991-97.2 
Compared to this period of flexible exchange 
rates, today’s fiscal position of Italy does not 
seem so dire: the snowball factor remains, at 
around 4 percentage points, much below the 
level of over 8 percentage points of the early 
1990s. The spread on German government 
securities (the benchmark risk-free rate) would 
have to double for the snowball effect to reach 
the same level of tension as 15 years ago. 
Moreover, interest on public debt now accounts 
for about 5% of GDP, again less than one-half the 
level during the 1990s and it would take several 
years before high interest rates would translate 
into materially higher interest expenditure for 
the government. 
Figure 1 also suggests that the sharp fall in 
nominal GDP right after the Lehman collapse 
induced a short-lived spike in the snowball 
effect, which was apparently discounted by the 
financial markets because of its temporary 
nature.  
                                                            
2 Data from the European Commission services, 
Ameco database. 4 | D
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In the light of the current emphasis on growth, it 
is interesting to note that the sharp fiscal 
adjustment of the mid- to end 1990s did not seem 
to have depressed growth enough to prevent 
these reductions in the snowball factor, which 
already incorporates any negative effects of a 
fiscal adjustment on growth.3 This episode goes 
against the argument that a cut in expenditure 
(or an increase in taxes) would be self-defeating 
because it reduces demand and hence GDP. 
Moreover, if it were true, it would follow that tax 
cuts would actually lead to lower deficits 
because higher growth would more than offset 
the lower tax revenues. This proposition has 
been tested several times in the US, but 
supporting evidence was never found.4  
                                                            
3 Moreover, as suggested by the literature on non-
Keynesian effects which flourished in the late 1990s 
(among other see Giavazzi & Pagano, 1996), fiscal 
adjustments (in the case of Italy combined with the 
prospect of joining the EMU) could have affected 
positively demand through confidence effects and 
offset the usual Keynesian effects. 
4 See for instance the report by the Center of Budget 
and Policy Priorities on the expansionary policy of 
2001-07 (see CBPP, 2009). 
Another indicator of the pressure on government 
finances during the 1990s is the amount spent on 
interest payments. Figure 3 shows interest 
payments on general government debt as a 
p e r c e n t a g e  o f  G D P .  I t  i s  a p p a r e n t  t h a t  d u r i n g  
that time interest payments were much more 
important than today. During the several years 
the Italian government had to spend over 10% of 
GDP on interest payments alone. Today it is still 
less than 5% of GDP and even if interest rates 
went to 8%, the burden for the government 
would increase only slowly since the average 
maturity of Italian public debt is above 7% per 
year. With interest rates at 8% it would take 
probably until 2020 for interest payments to 
come close to 10% of GDP (under the 
assumption that the debt remains at 120% of 
GDP. 
Figure 3. The interest burden in a longer perspective 
 
Source: European Commission Services (Ameco) data. 
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All in all, the experience of the 1990s suggests, 
contrary to the assertions of many 
commentators, that Italy’s public finances cannot 
be said to be unsustainable at interest rates 
beyond 5-6% and a snowball factor around 4-5 
percentage points. 
How is the current situation different from the 
1990s? First of all, the market turbulences during 
the summer of 2011 suggest that the risk 
premium alone does not seem to represent a 
comprehensive indicator of the degree of crisis of 
a country. Yields on Italian government bonds 
increased substantially over the summer of 2011, 
but remained low by the standards of the 1990s. 
Yet tensions on the financial markets were (and 
still are) extremely high with the flash point for 
financial markets being the banking system: the 
shares of Italian banks have plunged to multi-
year lows and these banks are no longer able to 
refinance themselves on the interbank market.  
Secondly, in order to make spreads in the 1990s 
and today fully comparable, one should 
eliminate the currency risk component from the 
former. For this purpose one should consider the 
behaviour of the risk premium on Italy’s foreign 
currency debt. As shown in Figure 4, which 
displays the difference between the yield on a 
very long dated Italian government bond 
denominated in US dollars and US government 
securities, throughout the period when Italy 
experienced sustained speculative attacks on its 
currency, the risk premium on its foreign 
currency-denominated debt remained most of 
the time below 100 basis points. It is only in the 
summer of 2011 that the risk premium has risen 
to over 300 basis points (about the same 
magnitude as that on euro debt relative to 
Bunds). 
Figure 4. Spreads on Italian sovereign bonds denominated in US dollars relative to US Treasury bonds 
 
Source: Bloomberg. 
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One way to interpret today’s much higher risk 
premium would be of course to assert that 
markets at present have much less faith in the 
willingness of the Italian political system to do 
‘whatever it takes’ to get public finances under 
control.5 Otherwise, the case of Italy would 
present a puzzle: on the one hand, the stress on 
government finances was much stronger during 
the 1990s than today, but, on the other hand, risk 
p r e m i a  o n  f o r e i g n  d e b t  ( a n d  e u r o  d e b t  i s  
effectively in a foreign currency) are much 
higher today.  
That the willingness of the Italian political 
system to make the difficult choices needed to 
service the debt has been declining over the last 
decade is reflected in the long-term downward 
trend in the rating of the Italy’s public debt. As 
shown earlier in Figure 1, the rating of Italy 
today is several notches below that of the mid-
1990s, although the debt level is about the same 
as a percentage of GDP. However, Italy’s rating 
was lowered already twice beforehand (in 2004 
and 2006), without provoking much reaction in 
the financial markets.  
Sovereigns like banks 
The considerations above reinforce the view that 
the fundamental problem for the euro area at 
present is not so much high interest rates on 
government debt and potentially multiple 
equilibria, but liquidity, both for the sovereign 
and the banking system. 
For the sovereign, the problem can be 
summarised as a maturity mismatch issue: a 
government has long-term assets (flow of tax 
revenues) and liabilities of a much shorter 
duration. A country with a balanced budget 
would normally be considered solvent even if 
the debt-to-GDP ratio is 100%, because with a 
balanced budget the debt-to-GDP ratio will 
decline towards zero as long as GDP grows in 
nominal terms. However, even if the average 
maturity of government debt is 8 years (rather 
conservative and almost the case for Italy), the 
same country has to refinance every year 12.5% 
of GDP – much above what even the strongest 
government could hope to finance out of a 
                                                            
5  This  was one of the motivations for the recent 
downgrade of Italian debt; see Moody’s report of 4 
October 2011. 
surplus. This implies that any government could 
become immediately insolvent if investors refuse 
to roll over the debt coming due. This is exactly 
the same mechanism as in a bank run. If all 
depositors want their money back at the same 
time, the bank will not be able to liquidate 
immediately its loan portfolio (Diamond & 
Dybwig, 1983). 
The danger of a run on government debt does 
not exist outside a monetary union, under the 
assumption that the national central bank 
provides the liquidity needed to keep the 
sovereign solvent in the short run even in the 
event of a total investors’ strike. The potential for 
bank runs and their widespread occurrence 
during the 1930s was the main reason why 
central banks became the lender of last resort for 
banks. Within the euro area, national 
governments,6 similarly to banks, need a 
liquidity back-up which can be provided only by 
the ECB. Any liquidity backstop mechanism – 
whether for banks or for sovereigns – requires by 
definition a distinction between insolvency and 
illiquidity. For banks the final decision is usually 
taken by the fiscal authorities; Gros & Mayer 
(2011) argue that one should also follow the 
same approach for euro area sovereigns. 
The experience after the Lehman collapse has 
shown that the real economy is severely affected 
if liquidity in the interbank markets dries up. 
Since the summer of 2011, Europe has been 
going through a similar experience but for 
different reasons. Economists have difficulties 
capturing this transmission channel in their 
models and how it has changed with the advent 
of the euro. One concrete example of a specific 
mechanism at work is the ruling of a major 
London-based clearinghouse that states that the 
haircut on government bonds used in repo 
operations jumps to 15% when the risk premium 
of the country concerned rises above 450 basis 
points. The reasoning used to justify this ruling 
is that a high risk premium indicates a high 
probability of default. This shows that for 
financial markets the issue is not the level of 
interest rates and their mechanical implications 
for debt sustainability. As Bund rates fall 
towards 1.5%, a risk premium of 450 basis points 
                                                            
6 This is not needed for state governments in the US 
which do not have sizeable debt levels (on average 
less than 6% of GDP). 8 | DANIEL GROS 
 
implies a yield on Italian government bonds of 
about 6%, hardly a level at which Italy’s debt 
would no longer be sustainable, at least if one 
uses the 1990s as the benchmark. However, 
should the risk premium reach this level, a 
mechanical application of this rule would 
severely restrict the access of Italian banks to the 
interbank repo market. 
Another, and perhaps even more important, 
liquidity squeeze results from the informal ‘red 
lining’ of all Italian (and in general peripheral) 
exposures by risk managers and supervisory 
authorities elsewhere in the EU and beyond: for 
instance, Denmark’s biggest pension fund has 
ruled out accepting Italian (or even French) 
bonds as collateral.7 The perception of a 
pervasive ‘counterparty risk’ was also the main 
reason why the interbank market froze after the 
bankruptcy of Lehman. Unfortunately it seems 
that some regulators reinforce this effect by 
limiting even transfers within international 
banking groups (e.g. from the German 
subsidiary to the Italian headquarter bank). Until 
recently sovereign risk was not recognised at all 
within the eurozone. It seems now that some 
supervisors (mostly in the creditor countries) are 
making the crisis worse by going to the opposite 
extreme: all exposure to a country whose public 
debt trades at a risk premium is suddenly 
considered risky.  
Concluding considerations 
The idea that, within a monetary union, high 
levels of public debt lead inherently to more 
instability because higher interest rates on public 
debt could, in the end, make it more attractive to 
default than to increase taxes is intellectually 
appealing. But is it the best way to understand 
the euro crisis? 
At the conceptual level, one important aspect 
overlooked by the literature is uncertainty. The 
models underlying the view that high public 
debt is inherently unstable in a monetary union 
usually assume a binary decision rule for the 
government: if interest rates are too high, it 
defaults; if interest rates are low enough, it does 
not. Thus there is no uncertainty once a 
threshold interest rate has been passed. 
However, in reality this is not the case. Even 
                                                            
7 Other anecdotal evidence reported by Bloomberg.  
once the interest rate threshold has been set, 
much uncertainty persists as to whether there 
will be default or not.  
One key reason for this uncertainty is that the 
future contains many sub-periods during which 
many important changes can take place. One 
particularly important factor is the political 
process. In reality, at least one and possibly 
several elections are likely to be held between 
the period in which interest rates are set in the 
market and the final period when the 
government decides whether to default and 
what haircut to impose on creditors. Different 
parties will compete and might have different 
views on default (or inflation). Some of them 
might oppose default on non-economic grounds, 
or because they have a different view of the cost 
of defaulting (inflation). There is thus a large 
range of interest rates over which there is some 
likelihood of a default (or inflation) and a lower 
range over which multiple equilibria might exist. 
Consistent with this idea Adrian & Gros (1999) 
also find: “An increase in the uncertainty of the 
shocks hitting the economy reduces the 
parameter range in which multiple equilibria can 
arise.” 
However, these considerations reinforce the 
view that the fundamental problem behind the 
current eurozone crisis is liquidity both for banks 
and sovereigns. Two policy conclusions emerge: 
•  First, policy-makers in the creditor 
countries should realise that they might be 
condemned to continuously pump more 
funds into banking rescues and the 
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) 
until the moment when the supervisors 
impose a ‘sudden stop’ on the euro 
periphery, thereby depriving the banks 
and sovereigns of the periphery of 
liquidity. 
•  Second, the ECB should concentrate more 
on ‘non-standard’ measures to support the 
interbank market and to provide liquidity 
for the banking system, rather than 
keeping the yield on Italian government 
bonds low. Liquidity backstops for 
sovereigns should be reserved for extreme 
situations.  SPECULATIVE ATTACKS WITHIN OR OUTSIDE A MONETARY UNION | 9 
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facing Europe today, 
•  Maintain the highest standards of academic excellence and unqualified independence  
•  Act as a forum for discussion among all stakeholders in the European policy process, and 
•  Provide a regular flow of authoritative publications offering policy analysis and 
recommendations, 
Assets 
•  Multidisciplinary, multinational & multicultural research team of knowledgeable analysts, 
•  Participation in several research networks, comprising other highly reputable research 
institutes from throughout Europe, to complement and consolidate CEPS’ research expertise 
and to extend its outreach,  
•  An extensive membership base of some 132 Corporate Members and 118 Institutional 
Members, which provide expertise and practical experience and act as a sounding board for 
the feasibility of CEPS policy proposals. 
Programme Structure 
In-house Research Programmes 
Economic and Social Welfare Policies 
Financial Institutions and Markets 
Energy and Climate Change 
EU Foreign, Security and Neighbourhood Policy 
Justice and Home Affairs 
Politics and Institutions 
Regulatory Affairs 
Agricultural and Rural Policy 
Independent Research Institutes managed by CEPS 
European Capital Markets Institute (ECMI) 
European Credit Research Institute (ECRI) 
Research Networks organised by CEPS 
European Climate Platform (ECP) 
European Network for Better Regulation (ENBR) 
European Network of Economic Policy 
Research Institutes (ENEPRI) 
European Policy Institutes Network (EPIN) 
 